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4 November 1960



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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF



I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR-UN: Soviet UN delegate Zorin's negative stand in his recent private exchange with Ambassador Wadsworth provides further evidence that the USSR is not interested in resuming disarmament negotiations, at least not until after a new United States administration is installed. Moscow's present objective is to induce the uncommitted nations to bring pressure on the West to accept Soviet disarmament proposals as the basis for negotiations. Efforts by neutralist delegations, led by India, to work out a compromise UN resolution have created a situation which makes it difficult and embarrassing at this stage for the bloc delegates to carry out Khrushchev's threat to walk out of the UN disarmament debate if Soviet proposals are not accepted as the basis for discussion.

*A Soviet official has indicated to a member of the US delegation in New York that the bloc will seek to amend the draft resolution being circulated by India to include provisions for establishing a new 15-nation committee and specific directives for the committee to work out a treaty on complete and general disarmament. He warned that if these amendments are not accepted, the bloc will withdraw from the debate.

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Berlin: The East Germans are attempting to assert a right to determine arbitrarily what types of materials can be shipped from West Berlin, and thereby indirectly claiming the right to decide what exports can be manufactured in West Berlin without violation of four-power agreements prohibiting military production in the city. The East Germans have instituted a campaign of harassment against trucks en route from West Berlin to West Germany with electrical and electronic equipment--one of West Berlin's most important

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exports--claiming that this is "war material." At least four trucks have recently been detained at the Babelsberg checkpoint outside West Berlin; the cargoes of two were confiscated and one other was allowed to proceed only after payment of a fine. East German authorities subjected officials of one firm to long interrogations and demanded to inspect the records of the firm's shipments over the past six months.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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South Vietnam: A series of recent attacks by Communist guerrillas on government installations in the central highlands region of South Vietnam indicate that the guerrillas now are striking in considerable force in this previously quiescent area. Sketchy reports suggest that the strikes were made by bands of up to 300 mountain tribesmen from the Lao tian border area under cadres infiltrated into South Vietnam through Laos from Communist North Vietnam. The spread of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, which was sharply intensified earlier this year in the southern delta provinces, will add to the military and political pressures on the Diem government.

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Laos: Premier Souvanna is reported to have taken fresh steps to induce Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Neo Lao Hak Sat, the Pathet Lao's political front, to come to Vientiane for peace talks. This action may have been prompted by the recently formed Committee for Neutrality and National Unity,

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with which both Souvanna and Souphanouvong are associated. Souvanna may feel that he and Souphanouvong can come to terms on the broad outline of a unification agreement that will guide the negotiating teams meeting in Vientiane.

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III. THE WEST

Cuba-Guatemala: [The Castro regime is giving financial assistance and intends to provide weapons to the Guatemalan Communist party and a Communist-infiltrated Guatemalan revolutionary group,

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"Che" Guevara, with the approval of Fidel and Raul Castro, is said to have given the Guatemalan groups \$15,000 last month on the condition that the Guatemalan Communists play the leading role in the revolution. Former Guatemalan President Arbenz, now in Cuba, is to be the "Havana representative" of the movement. The goal is the destruction of the Guatemalan Army and the arming of the "masses," as in Cuba.

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IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding two weeks)

Outlook for India Over Next Few Years: Likely Political and Economic Developments, Military Capabilities, and Foreign Relations. NIE 51-60. 25 October 1960.

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Outlook for Iraq: Stability of the Qasim Regime in View of Qasim's Failure to Solve Political and Economic Problems; Weakness of the Opposition; and Foreign Policies. NIE 36-2.60. 1 November 1960.


Problems Affecting the North Atlantic Alliance: Factors Likely to Challenge Basic Concepts and Arrangements of NATO During the 1960s and Concepts Most Likely to Be Challenged. NIE 20-60. 1 November 1960.

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Soviet Disarmament Tactics

[S]oviet UN Delegate Zorin's negative stand in his private exchange with Ambassador Wadsworth on 1 November provides further evidence that the USSR is not interested in resuming disarmament negotiations, at least not until after the new United States administration is installed, and that Moscow's present objective is to induce the uncommitted nations to press the West to accept Soviet disarmament proposals as the basis for discussions. Zorin termed Wadsworth's statement on American policy "unfortunate and discouraging" and insisted that the USSR's plan for complete and general disarmament offered the only way to solve real problems. He said the US proposal to terminate the production of nuclear weapons would only create false illusions and could not lead to progress.

[E]fforts by Afro-Asian neutralist delegations, led by India, to work out a compromise disarmament resolution have created a situation which makes it difficult and embarrassing at this stage for bloc delegations to carry out Khrushchev's threat to walk out of the UN disarmament debate if the Soviet position is not accepted as the basis for discussion.

A member of the Soviet UN delegation has indicated privately that the Indian draft resolution offers the only possible hope for agreement and that the bloc will seek to amend it to include provisions for establishing a 15-nation committee and specific directives for the committee to work out a treaty on complete and general disarmament. He warned that if these amendments are not accepted, or if the Indian resolution with Soviet amendments fails, the bloc will withdraw from the debate and wait for a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider disarmament next spring. In a recent talk with Ambassador Thompson, First Deputy Premier Kosygin insisted that this proposal for a special session was not a propaganda maneuver but a serious bid to "give a push" to disarmament negotiations.

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Communist Guerrillas Active in Central Highlands of South Vietnam

Recent guerrilla attacks on South Vietnamese government installations in the highlands of central Vietnam indicate that the Communists now are striking in a considerable force in this region, which previously has been relatively secure. Although details are sketchy, a number of attacks apparently were made between 20 and 25 October against military outposts and road construction camps in Kontum and Pleiku provinces near the Laotian border, with diversionary actions occurring in Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh provinces to the east. The guerrillas, who were driven off by local militias reinforced by regular army and paratroop battalions, reportedly were operating in bands of up to 300, consisting chiefly of mountain tribesmen from the border region. They are believed to have operated under cadres infiltrated through Laos from North Vietnam.

There is no evidence, however, to substantiate initial reports from some South Vietnamese officials that the attacks were a large-scale incursion by regular North Vietnamese forces crossing Laos. The Diem government may have exaggerated evidence of North Vietnamese involvement in the hope of charging Hanoi with violations of the 1954 truce agreement and justifying its position that military needs to meet the Communist guerrilla threat require the postponement of political and social reforms. The North Vietnamese have clearly shown in the past few months that they intend to increase both violence and political agitation in the South. Hanoi, however, has denied Saigon's claim that North Vietnamese troops entered the South from Laos, charging that this "Western fabrication" was intended as an excuse for South Vietnamese intervention in Laos.


The spread of guerrilla activity to central Vietnam places an increasing burden on local security forces as well as on the army, which has over the past year been partially diverted from border defense to meet the stepped-up Communist warfare in the southern delta provinces near Saigon. Deteriorating security may also be taken by Diem as evidence of the need for maintaining authoritarian control, thus adding to growing dissatisfaction with his regime.

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